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STRIKING THE BALANCE OF FAIRNESS AND INCLUSION:
THE FUTURE OF WOMEN’S SPORTS AFTER THE
SUPREME COURT’S LANDMARK DECISION IN
BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY, GA
I. RIGHT OFF THE BAT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
EFFECTS OF BOSTOCK
On June 15, 2020 the Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton
County, Georgia ruled that sexual orientation and transgender dis-
crimination qualifies as “because of sex” discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  In this 6-3 decision, both the
majority and dissent recognized the weighty implications the
Court’s ruling may have on other state and federal laws that pro-
hibit sex discrimination.2  Justice Alito warned in his dissent that
one issue that may arise under both Title VII and Title IX is the
“right of a transgender individual to participate on a sports team or
in an athletic competition previously reserved for members of one
biological sex.”3  The Court concluded, however, that the textual
interpretation of the law is of greater importance than analyzing
the potential consequences that may result from the decision.4  Fur-
ther, the Court articulated that “[w]hether other policies and prac-
tices might or might not qualify as unlawful discrimination or find
1. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“An employer
who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for
traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex
plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII
forbids.”).  Under Title VII, it is “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individ-
ual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991) (stating Title VII language).
2. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (discussing dissenting opinion’s concerns
about consequences that might follow ruling for employees, such as issues con-
cerning “bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind”).
3. See id. at 1778-83 (Alito, J., dissenting) (flagging potential consequences
Court’s decision may have on other sex discrimination statutes, but not suggesting
how these issues will play out under Court’s reasoning); see generally 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972) (“No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
4. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (“The place to make new legislation or ad-
dress unwanted consequences . . . lies in Congress. When it comes to statutory
interpretation, our role is limited to applying the law’s demands as faithfully as we
can in the cases that come before us.”).
(415)
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justifications under other provisions of Title VII are questions for
future cases, not these.”5
The Supreme Court may not have to wait long before having to
address the impact of the Bostock decision beyond the employment
law context.6  Just as Justice Alito predicted, in the wake of Bostock,
legislators and attorneys have been arguing about the impact that
Title VII and Title IX jurisprudence may have on the ability of
transgender and transitioning individuals to compete in athletic
events.7  Proponents of legislation barring transgender athletes
from certain athletic competitions believe that requiring athletes to
compete against those that are transgender denies them, particu-
larly women, equal opportunity in athletics.8  Specifically, some
have argued that athletes who transition from male to female pos-
sess physical advantages over those assigned female at birth.9  In
5. See id. (refusing to weigh-in on other issues that may be presented from this
decision).
6. For further discussion of Bostock’s potential effects outside the employment
law context, see infra notes 175-202 and accompanying text.
7. See A Glossary: Defining Transgender Terms, APA (Sept. 2018), https://
www.apa.org/monitor/2018/09/ce-corner-glossary [https://perma.cc/K67W-
4YK2] (defining terms “transgender” and “transitioning”).  An individual who is
transgender is “an umbrella term encompassing those who gender identities or
gender roles differ from those typically associated with the sex they were assigned
at birth,” and someone who is transitioning is in the process of “shifting toward a
gender role different from that assigned at birth, which can include social transi-
tion, such as new names, pronouns and clothing, and medical transition, such as
hormone therapy or surgery.” See id. (recognizing language used to describe expe-
rience of transgender and gender-nonconforming individuals rapidly evolves).
For further discussion of the implications Bostock may have on Title VII and Title
IX, see infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
8. See Jennifer C. Braceras, Editorial, On the Anniversary of Title IX, Are Women’s
Sports in Jeopardy?, HILL (June 23, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/
504011-on-the-anniversary-of-title-ix-are-womens-sports-in-jeopardy [https://
perma.cc/DG87-67VZ] (arguing female athletes will lose spots on athletic teams
with limited rosters because female athletes will lose to male-bodied athletes in
head-to-head competitions most of the time); Press Release, William P. Barr,
United States Attorney General, Barr Statement on Interest Defending the Consti-
tutionality of Idaho’s Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (June 19, 2020) (on file with
author), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-statement-inter-
est-defending-constitutionality-idaho-s-fairness [https://perma.cc/XS5N-ESF9]
(“Allowing biological males to compete in all-female sports is fundamentally unfair
to female athletes.”).
9. See Sex Hormones and Athletes, UNIV. OF WASH. DEP’T OF MED. (July 10, 2019),
https://medicine.uw.edu/news/sex-hormones-and-athletes [https://perma.cc/
U9GC-EP4A] (finding trans female athletes who transition from male to female
are on average taller than biological female athletes and have more muscle mass);
A Ban by World Rugby Could Prove Influential for Transgender Sports, ECONOMIST (Oct.
17, 2020), https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2020/10/17/a-
ban-by-world-rugby-could-prove-influential-for-transgender-sports [https://
perma.cc/SA2Y-B4PT] (“Sports science confirms what common experience sug-
gests: most males are bigger, stronger, and faster than most females. They have
2
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contrast, opponents have argued that no unfair advantage has been
demonstrated and transgender athletes have a right to participate
in athletics consistent with their gender identity.10
This hot topic debate is playing out across the United States.11
In Connecticut, three female high school track athletes filed a law-
suit in federal court against Connecticut school boards and the
Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (CIAC) for adopt-
ing a policy to allow transgender students to compete on teams that
correspond with their gender identity.12  This case captured the at-
bigger muscles, bigger hearts and bigger lungs, as well as a greater capacity to
transport and use oxygen, stronger bones and tougher ligaments.”); Letting Trans
Women Play in Women’s Sports is Often Unfair, ECONOMIST (Oct. 17, 2020), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/2020/10/17/letting-trans-women-play-in-womens-
sports-is-often-unfair [https://perma.cc/W585-RX7W] (explaining sex-based ad-
vantages arise from testosterone, primarily male hormone, and suppressing testos-
terone only appears to have minor impact to undo advantage male athletes have
over female athletes); Gillian R. Brassil & Jeré Longman, Who Should Compete in
Women’s Sports? There are ‘Two Almost Irreconcilable Positions’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/sports/transgender-athletes-
womens-sports-idaho.html [https://perma.cc/629W-6EEC] (“But some evidence
suggests that residual strength and muscle mass advantages largely remain when
people assigned as males at birth undergo testosterone suppression for a year.”).
10. See Brassil & Longman, supra note 9 (observing comment from director of
Center for Genetic Medicine Research at Children’s National Hospital in Washing-
ton saying, “[e]ven if transgender athletes retain some competitive advantages, it
does not necessarily mean that the advantages are unfair, because all top athletes
possess some edge over their peers”); see also ACLU Responds to Lawsuit Attacking
Transgender Student Athletes, ACLU CONN. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.acluct.org/
en/press-releases/aclu-responds-lawsuit-attacking-transgender-student-athletes
[https://perma.cc/6HPJ-XVM2] (mentioning statement from transgender stu-
dent athlete “[t]he more we are told that we don’t belong and should be ashamed
of who we are, the fewer opportunities we have to participate in sports at all”);
Katherine Kornei, This Scientist is Racing to Discover How Gender Transitions Alter Ath-
letic Performance – Including Her Own, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (July
25, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/07/scientist-racing-discover-
how-gender-transitions-alter-athletic-performance-including [https://perma.cc/
4QS7-H79Y] (challenging assumption transgender women have athletic advan-
tages over non-transgender women with study that found “transgender women
who received treatment to lower their testosterone levels did no better in a variety
of races against female peers than they had previously done against male
runners”).
11. For further discussion of the legislative and legal battles concerning trans-
gender athletes’ rights across America, see infra notes 108-126 and accompanying
text.
12. See CIAC Transgender Policy, https://www.casciac.org/pdfs/Princi-
pal_Transgender_Discussion_Quick_Reference_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JR6S-CWPP] (stating CIAC is “committed to providing transgender student-ath-
letes with equal opportunities to participate in CIAC athletic programs consistent
with their gender identity”); see also Christina Maxouris, 3 Connecticut High School
Girls Are Suing Over A Policy That Allows Trans Athletes to Compete in Girls’ Sports, CNN
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/14/us/transgender-athletes-con-
necticut-lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z4MP-6PFR] (noting female ath-
letes’ position is CIAC policy results in “boys displacing girls in competitive track
3
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tention of the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) who opened their own investigation and found that the
transgender participation policy “denied athletic benefits and op-
portunities to female student-athletes.”13  In late August of 2020,
OCR threatened to withhold millions of dollars of federal desegre-
gation funding if the Connecticut schools kept the transgender par-
ticipation policy.14  OCR also delineated that the Bostock holding
does not apply to Title IX, and even if it did, Title IX still would not
permit biological males to compete against biological females on a
sex-segregated team.15
While this litigation was pending on the East Coast, Idaho
lawmakers passed a bill to make Idaho the first state to ban trans-
gender athletes from participating on girls’ sports teams at the pri-
events in Connecticut” and is a violation of Title IX); Katie Barnes, The Battle over
Title IX and Who Gets to Be a Woman in Sports: Inside the Raging National Debate, ESPN
(June 23, 2020), https://www.espn.com/espnw/story/_/id/29347507/the-battle-
title-ix-gets-woman-sports-raging-national-debate [https://perma.cc/3LC8-42F4]
(“Connecticut is one of 18 states, along with the District of Columbia, to allow high
school transgender athletes to compete in accordance with their gender identity
rather than their sex assigned at birth.”).
13. See Letter of Impending Action from United States Department of Educa-
tion, Office for Civil Rights, to Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference,
Glastonbury Public Schools, Bloomfield Public Schools, Canton Public Schools,
Cromwell Public Schools, Danbury Public Schools and Hartford Public Schools
(May 15, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter of Impending Action],
https://www.adflegal.org/case/soule-v-connecticut-association-schools [https://
perma.cc/G6H3-CF46] (choose “U.S. DOE Office for Civil Rights, Letter of Im-
pending Action” from dropdown and follow hyperlink) (summarizing findings
that CIAC transgender participation policy was noncompliant with Title IX, and
mandating Connecticut schools and CIAC to resolve identified areas of
noncompliance).
14. See Luke Broadwater & Erica L. Green, DeVos Vows to Withhold Desegregation
Aid to Schools Over Transgender Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/transgender-students-betsy-devos.html [https:/
/perma.cc/N2Y3-M7E2] (“The move to withhold about $18 million intended to
help schools desegregate could have national implications for both transgender
athletes and students of color.”).
15. See Letter from Kimberly M. Richey, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights, to Lori Mizerak, Attorney for Hartford Public Schools, City of Hartford;
David S. Monastersky, Attorney for Glastonbury Public Schools and Canton Public
Schools, Howd & Ludorf, LLC; Peter J. Murphy, Attorney for Connecticut Inter-
scholastic Athletic Conference and Danbury Public Schools, Shipman & Goodwin,
LLP, Linda L. Yoder, Attorney for Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference
and Danbury Public Schools, Shipman & Goodwin, LLC; Johanna Zelman, Attor-
ney for Bloomfield Public Schools and Cromwell Public Schools, Ford Harrison
(Aug. 31, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Department of Educa-
tion], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/
01194025-a2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA7W-Q5AK] (“Even if Bostock applied to Ti-
tle IX – a question the Supreme Court expressly declined to address – its reason-
ing would only confirm that Title IX does not permit a biologically male student to
compete against females on a sex-segregated team or in a sex-segregated league.”).
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mary, secondary, and college levels.16  More than a dozen states
have followed suit and introduced similar legislation.17  Scholars be-
lieve that the “simultaneous activity in so many states means lawsuits
opposing new state laws, like Idaho’s or transgender-friendly poli-
cies like those in Connecticut, are likely to move up to the Supreme
Court.”18
Now this debate has reached the national stage.19  On Decem-
ber 10, 2020, Democratic Hawaii Representative and former 2020
Presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard introduced a bill, titled the
“Protect Women’s Sports Act,” with Republican Representative
Markwayne Mullin.20  This bill, if enacted, would deny federal fund-
ing to schools that permit a biological male to participate in an ath-
letic program or activity that is designated for biological women or
girls.21  In a statement by Rep. Gabbard, she said “Title IX is being
weakened by some states who are misinterpreting [it], creating un-
certainty, undue hardship, and lost opportunities for female ath-
letes . . . [o]ur legislation protects Title IX’s original intent which
was based on the general biological distinction between men and
women athletes based on sex.”22  This proposal runs counter to an
executive order signed by Democratic President Joe Biden on Janu-
16. See Transgender Athlete Fight to Heat Up as Legislatures Return, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Oct. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Transgender Athletes’ Fight for Rights], https://
www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X8S052K8000000?bna_news_filter=US-law-
week&jcsearch=BNA%252000000174db04d23ea5f5dfc5a13d0001#jcite [https://
perma.cc/UT2A-T4EZ] (observing Idaho as first state to enact law barring trans-
gender participation in sports).
17. See id. (“States that have introduced transgender-exclusion bills this year
include Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee, and
Washington.”).
18. See id. (demonstrating divide in opinion between states increases likeli-
hood this issue will end up before nation’s top justices); see also Dan Avery, State
Anti-Transgender Bills Represent Coordinated Attack, Advocates Say, NBC News (Feb. 17,
2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/state-anti-transgender-bills-re-
present-coordinated-attack-advocates-say-n1258124 [https://perma.cc/2XGL-
TYRN] (finding bills in at least 20 states have been introduced to restrict trans-
gender students’ participation in sports).
19. For further discussion of federal legislation introduced to ban biological
male athletes from competing in female sports, see infra notes 108-126 and accom-
panying text.
20. See Madeleine Carlisle, Tulsi Gabbard Introduces Bill That Would Ban Trans
Women and Girls from Female Sports, TIME (Dec. 11, 2020), https://time.com/
5920758/tulsi-gabbard-bill-transgender-women-sports/ [https://perma.cc/Z3ZM-
D7NE] (commenting on new legislation introduced in U.S. House of
Representatives).
21. See id. (“Allowing biological males to compete in women’s sports dimin-
ishes equality and takes away from the original intent of Title IX.”).
22. See id. (reporting Rep. Gabbard’s reasoning for sponsoring this bill).
5
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ary 20, 2021 which prohibits discrimination based on gender iden-
tity in sports.23
Although the Bostock decision has left little guidance for how
lower courts should rule on future cases concerning Title VII and
Title IX protections of transgender athletes, this Note asserts that
the Supreme Court correctly relied on its interpretation of the text
of Title VII to find that sex discrimination includes sexual orienta-
tion and transgender discrimination.24  Section II of this Note in-
troduces the relevant facts of Bostock and explains the holding of
the case.  Section III outlines the background of Title VII and Title
IX.  In addition, Section III examines Title VII’s “because of sex”
jurisprudence.25  Section IV summarizes the Supreme Court’s Title
VII analysis.26  Section V postulates the Court’s decision is in line
with the Court’s statutory interpretation of Title VII and judicial
precedent, but recognizes issues may arise from this decision
outside of the employment context.27  Finally, Section VI concludes
by discussing the impact Bostock may have on transgender participa-
tion in girls’ and women’s sports.28
II. A DEEP DIVE INTO THE FACTS OF Bostock
In Bostock, the United States Supreme Court consolidated three
different cases addressing whether an employer can fire an em-
ployee because the employee is homosexual or transgender.29  The
plaintiffs in all three cases brought Title VII claims against their
23. See Exec. Order No. 13988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021) (stating
children should be able to learn without being denied access to school sports and
“[a]ll persons should receive equal treatment under the law, no matter their gen-
der identity or sexual orientation”).
24. For further discussion of the Court’s decision to strictly adhere to the text
of Title VII, see infra notes 135-156 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the facts of Bostock, see infra notes 29-54 and
accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of Title VII and Title IX, see infra notes 63-104 and
accompanying text.
27. For further discussion of the Court’s statutory interpretation of Title VII,
see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
28. For further discussion of the Bostock’s decisions impact on women’s sports,
see infra notes 176-202 and accompanying text.
29. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (explaining how
case reached Supreme Court); see generally Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (examining Title VII lawsuit after employee was
fired when employee participated in gay softball league); E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Harris Fu-
neral Homes] (analyzing Title VII lawsuit after employee was fired when employee
changed gender from male to female); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Zarda] (examining Title VII lawsuit after employee
was fired after disclosing sexual orientation to customer).
6
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employers, with each plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination on
the basis of “sex” and arguing that the employer fired the employee
for being homosexual or transgender.30  These cases generated a
circuit split between federal appellate courts, each differing in their
determination of whether sexual orientation or gender identity dis-
crimination fall under the Title VII protected characteristic “sex.”31
The Supreme Court in Bostock evaluated the facts of these three
cases to resolve the circuit court split and clarify the definition of
sex in Title VII, holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity constituted discrimination based on
sex.32
A. Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia
Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County for over ten years
as a Child Welfare Services Coordinator, and in his tenure as Coor-
dinator he received accolades and good performance evaluations
from the County.33  While working as Coordinator, Bostock became
involved with a gay recreational softball league and actively pro-
moted the league for volunteer opportunities.34  The County termi-
nated Bostock’s employment approximately five months after his
participation in the softball league for “conduct unbecoming of a
County employee.”35  Bostock then brought suit against his former
employer for violation of Title VII alleging he was discriminated
against because of his sex.36  The case escalated to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, which held “the law does not prohibit employers from firing
employees for being gay so his suit could be dismissed as a matter of
law.”37
30. For further discussion of the cases leading up to the Bostock decision, see
infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
31. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (noting courts of appeals decided differently
on issue depending on circuit).
32. See id. at 1737-38 (detailing facts of each case that presented same ques-
tion whether sexual orientation and transgender discrimination is protected under
Title VII).
33. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty, No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2016 WL
9753356, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (describing plaintiff’s satisfactory work perform-
ance for Clayton County).
34. See id. (observing Mr. Bostock’s engagement with gay softball league).
35. Id. at *2 (describing employer’s reasoning for terminating Mr. Bostock’s
employment with County).
36. See id. (reasoning Mr. Bostock was discriminated against because of his
“sexual orientation and identity and participating in the softball league” and that
this is discrimination “because of sex”).
37. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (describing Eleventh Circuit holding).
7
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B. E.E.O.C v. Harris Funeral Homes
Amiee [sic] Australia Stephens, previously known as William
Anthony Beasley Stephens, was assigned male at birth and worked
as a Funeral Director/Embalmer at R.G & G.R Harris Funeral
Home for five years.38  Prior to transition and during her struggle
with a gender identity disorder, Stephens wrote a letter to her em-
ployer stating she intended to have sex reassignment surgery and to
“live and work full-time as a woman for a year.”39  Stephens wrote
that after a vacation, she would be “as her true self, Amiee [sic]
Australia Stephens, in appropriate business attire.”40
The employer postponed Stephens’ vacation, during which
time she would receive the reassignment surgery.41  After Stephens
had the sex reassignment surgery, the employer stated “this is not
going to work out” and fired her.42  Upon termination from her
role, Stephens filed a sex discrimination charge with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).43  The EEOC then
issued a letter of determination, stating that the funeral home “dis-
charged Stephens due to her sex and gender identity, female, in
violation of Title VII.”44  The Sixth Circuit determined that Title
VII forbids employers from firing employees because of their gen-
der identity.45
C. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.
Donald Zarda was a sky diving instructor at Altitude Express,
Inc.46  In this position, he was regularly strapped hip-to-hip and
shoulder-to-shoulder with clients.47 Mr. Zarda sometimes informed
38. See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 567
(6th Cir. 2018) (detailing Plaintiff’s job title and length of career at Harris Funeral
Homes).
39. See id. at 568 (explaining facts of case that give rise to ultimate adverse
employment action).
40. See id. at 569 (observing employee was forthcoming with her intention to
have re-assignment surgery).
41. See id. (noting employer inhibition with Ms. Stephens’ surgery).
42. See id. (discussing adverse employment action).
43. See id. (detailing legal action employee took against employer).
44. See id. (describing EEOC’s claim against employer).
45. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (recognizing
Sixth Circuit found that Title VII does protect employees from gender identity
discrimination because of sex); see generally Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 567
(concluding Ms. Stephens’ termination was violation of Title VII because of sex
discrimination).
46. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018)
(describing Mr. Zarda’s former occupation).
47. See id. (illustrating close contact between Mr. Zarda and skydiving clients).
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/5
2021] STRIKING THE BALANCE OF FAIRNESS AND INCLUSION 423
female clients that he was gay to make them feel more comfortable
when strapped to him.48  When preparing for a tandem skydive
with one client, Zarda told her that “he was gay and had an ex-
husband to prove it.”49  After the dive, the client told her boyfriend
that Zarda inappropriately touched her and used his sexual orienta-
tion as an excuse for his behavior.50  Zarda’s boss immediately fired
him when this was reported.51  Zarda denied touching the client
inappropriately and filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC
for being fired because of his reference to his sexual orientation.52
In this case, the Second Circuit found that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is discrimination based on “sex” protected by Title
VII.53
After reviewing the facts of these three distinct cases, the Su-
preme Court held, “[w]hen an employer fires an employee for be-
ing homosexual or transgender, it necessarily and intentionally
discriminates against that individual in part because of sex . . .
[A]nd that is all Title VII has ever demanded to establish liability.”54
III. THE FIGHT FOR A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: THE BACKGROUND OF
TITLE VII, TITLE IX, AND TRANSGENDER ATHLETES’
RIGHTS
The Bostock case made its way to the Supreme Court following
monumental legal victories for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans-
gender, Queer (LGBTQ) movement in its decades-long history.55
This movement shaped LGBTQ rights in America by eliminating
sodomy laws and recognizing same sex marriage.56  Employees have
been protected from sex discrimination in the workplace under Ti-
48. See id. (noting Mr. Zarda referencing his sexual orientation with clients).
49. Id. (recounting one incident between Mr. Zarda and client).
50. See id. (explaining situation that created adverse employment action
against Mr. Zarda).
51. See id. (establishing exact moment Mr. Zarda’s employer fired him).
52. See id. at 109 (describing action Mr. Zarda brought against his employer
for firing him).
53. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (observing Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision that sex discrimination includes sexual orientation
discrimination).
54. See id. at 1744 (stating Supreme Court’s holding).
55. See LGBTQ Rights Milestones Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 2, 2020), https://
www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/us/lgbt-rights-milestones-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K92G-M5Z6] (detailing history and timeline of LGBTQ
movement).
56. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647 (2015) (holding right to
marry “is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down “homosexual conduct” law
9
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tle VII for more than half a century.57  However, this same protec-
tion was not afforded to Americans in the workplace who identify as
anything other than heterosexual.58  The Court granted certiorari
in Bostock to “resolve at last the disagreement among the courts of
appeals over the scope of Title VII’s protections for homosexual
and transgender persons.”59  Important to understanding the legal
backdrop of the Bostock case, this Section will discuss Title VII’s leg-
islative history and judicial precedent.60  This Section will also ex-
plain the formative impact Title VII case law has historically had on
other sex discrimination statutes, such as Title IX.61  Finally, this
Section will conclude with background into the controversial issue
of transgender athletes’ rights.62
A. Legislative History of Title VII
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy appealed to Congress in
two separate letters stressing the importance of reducing “Negro
unemployment” by improving racial discrimination issues in the
workplace.63  These letters served as a catalyst for Congressional
that forbade two persons of same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct).
57. See e.g., Amanda Hainsworth, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 64 BOS. B.
J. 3, 22 (Aug. 17, 2020) (stating purpose of Title VII of Civil Rights Act is to guaran-
tee employees protections from discrimination).
58. See id. (stating courts historically have not recognized protections for sex-
ual orientation and transgender status discrimination); see generally Evans v. Ga.
Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Blum); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding discharge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII).
59. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (addressing federal circuit split on whether
Title VII sex discrimination encompasses transgender and sexual orientation dis-
crimination).  The Court notes that the Eleventh Circuit held that the law “does
not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay,” but the Second Cir-
cuit found sexual orientation discrimination a violation of Title VII and the Sixth
Circuit reached a similar holding barring employers from transgender discrimina-
tion. See id. (highlighting split in court of appeals opinions on this issue).
60. For further discussion of Title VII legislative history and jurisprudence,
see infra notes 63-100 and accompanying text.
61. For further discussion of Title VII’s impact on Title IX, see infra notes
101-104 and accompanying text.
62. For further discussion of controversial cases and regulatory policies con-
cerning transgender participation in sports, see infra notes 105-134 and accompa-
nying text.
63. See Francis J. Vaas, Comment, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV.
431, 432 (1966) (describing President Kennedy’s message to Congress, saying “the
relief of Negro unemployment required progress in three major areas, namely,
creating more jobs through greater economic growth, raising the level of skills
through more education and training and eliminating racial discrimination in em-
ployment”); see also Eric S. Dreiband & Brett Swearingen, The Evolution of Title VII
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, JONES DAY (Apr. 6,
10
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members to submit civil rights bills addressing these employment
issues.64  One of the bills was H.R. 405, “A Bill to Prohibit Discrimi-
nation in Employment in Certain Cases Because of Race, Religion,
Color, National Origin, Ancestry or Age,” the precursor to Title
VII.65  This bill was incorporated into the administration’s compre-
hensive bill H.R. 7152.66
The general debate on H.R. 7152 started on January 31, 1964
and continued for nine days.67  During the debate, over forty
amendments were proposed to Title VII, and sixteen were adopted
by the House.68  The Senate began its debate on H.R. 7152 on
March 30, 1964, after already spending “seventeen days in debating
procedural questions and whether or not it should even consider
the bill.”69  At the close of the debate, only two of the House’s
amendments survived the Senate’s rewriting of the bill.70
Virginia Representative Howard Smith’s amendment adding




RZA4-BAHW] (“Regarding employment discrimination, President Kennedy ap-
pealed to the democratic principle that no man should be denied employment
commensurate with his abilities because of his race or creed or ancestry.’”).
64. See Vaas, supra note 63, at 433 (“At the outset of the Eighty-eighth Con-
gress various Senators and Representatives submitted a plethora of civil rights bills.
Some included comprehensive provisions relating to all areas of civic and eco-
nomic life where discrimination existed . . . others dealt primarily with equal em-
ployment opportunity in both private and public employment.”).
65. See id. at 434 (observing Title VII’s language incorporates equal employ-
ment opportunity bill, H.R. 405).
66. See id. at 435 (explaining Title VII of H.R. 7152, as first introduced in
Congress, established “Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity” to pre-
vent discrimination on ground of “race, color, religion, or national origin in Gov-
ernment employment”).
67. See History of Bill: A Year of Words; HR 7152 Offered Casually in the House by
Celler, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/20/
archives/history-of-bill-a-year-of-words-hr-7152-offered-casually-in-the.html [https:/
/perma.cc/4KHT-XU24] (“The House filled 477 pages of the Congressional Re-
cord with civil rights debate lasting 73 hours 41 minutes over nine days, Jan. 31 to
Feb. 10.”).
68. See Delivering on a Dream: The House and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, History,
Art & Archives, (last visited Mar. 2, 2021), https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-
and-Publications/Civil-Rights/1964-Essay/ [https://perma.cc/YA5Y-35PQ] (stat-
ing two floor managers in debate Representative McCulloch and Celler “spent the
next eight days going title by title through the legislation, beating back amend-
ment after amendment intended to weaken the bill, accepting only those agreed
to by both men”).
69. See Vaas, supra note 63, at 433 (implying H.R. 7152 was controversial bill
that took time to secure passage).
70. See id. at 438 (observing Smith amendment and another House amend-
ment were adopted by Senate).
11
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Kennedy never mentioned sex discrimination in his appeals to Con-
gress for civil rights reform.71  Scholars have suggested Representa-
tive Smith, a public opponent of civil rights legislation, added the
amendment to sabotage H.R. 7152’s passage.72  It may be likely that
Representative Smith believed prohibiting discrimination against
women in the workplace would be unacceptable to Representatives
who may have voted for the proposed civil rights bill otherwise.73
However, Smith’s motivations may also be explained by the efforts
of the National Woman’s Party (“NWP”) and other women’s advo-
cates who executed a “carefully planned” addition to the civil rights
bill.74  As such, the legislative history is clouded by the social con-
struction of the events that led to the “because of sex” amendment
now found in Title VII.75
B. Interpretation of “Because of Sex” Discrimination Over the
Years
Title VII’s unclear legislative history leaves significant room for
debate in interpreting Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion.76  Historically, sex discrimination claims under Title VII gen-
erally comprised of women bringing actions against their employer
71. See Dreiband & Swearingen, supra note 63, at 1 (explaining discrimination
on basis of sex was not stressed by President as needed civil rights reform).
72. See Michael Evan Gold, Comment, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons
Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19
DUQUESNE L. REV. 453, 459-61 (1981) (observing Representative Green’s remarks
on sex discrimination amendment, saying, “[o]n the last day of House debate on
the Civil Rights Bill, Representative Smith, a staunch opponent of the Bill, pro-
posed, in jest, the inclusion of “sex” as a prohibited classification in an attempt to
make the Bill unacceptable to as many legislators as possible”).
73. See id. at 461 (explaining argument that “the unrepresentative majority
hoped to poison [H.R. 7152] with sex, perhaps calculating that votes to take sex
out of the bill could not be mustered but that, with sex in the bill, it could not
pass”).
74. See Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and
the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 409, 410 (2009) (noting “[f]eminists who wanted to ensure gender equal-
ity imagined [Smith’s amendment to Title VII of H.R. 7152] as a well-intentioned,
carefully planned addition to the bill”).  The NWP, an organization devoted to
advocating for equal rights, pushed for a sex provision in 1963 and wrote to Repre-
sentative Smith urging him to include “sex” in H.R. 7152. See id. at 414 (noting
another theory why sex was added to provisions of Title VII).
75. See id. at 438 (concluding legislative history is ambiguous concerning in-
tentionality and meaning of “because of sex” discrimination under Title VII).
76. See Courtney E. Ruggeri, Comment, Let’s Talk About Sex: A Discussion of
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII, 61 B.C. L. REV. 34, 37 (Mar. 9, 2020)
(“Oftentimes, the varying interpretations have been attributed to the limited legis-
lative history surrounding the inclusion of “sex” among the statute’s protected
classes.”).
12
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alleging disparate treatment.77  Early Title VII cases, like Holloway v.
Arther Andersen & Company, focused on discrimination because of
sex as a biological distinction.78  Over time the Supreme Court ad-
dressed more nuanced cases recognizing “sex” to mean more than
the biological distinction between males and females, including sex
discrimination generally, sexual harassment, sex stereotyping, and
gender based discrimination.
1. Sex Discrimination Generally
The Supreme Court addressed the definition of “sex” in 1971
when it ruled in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. that a company pol-
icy to refuse to hire women with preschool age children violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.79  A few years later, the
Court in Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart found that
making women pay more into a pension plan policy violates Title
VII because the policy does not “pass the simple test” of asking
whether an individual female employee would have been treated
the same regardless of her sex.80  In Manhart, the Court also recog-
nized that a policy may appear evenhanded at the group level but
can still be discriminatory at an individual level.81
2. Sexual Harassment
Furthermore, although the explicit language of Title VII does
not include “sexual harassment,” the Court has recognized it as a
violation of Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.82  The Court
77. See Anthony E. Verona & Jeffrey M. Monks, Comment, EN/Gendering
Equality: Seeking Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sex-
ual Orientation, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 72 (2000) (observing many of first
sex discrimination cases were brought by women against employers for disparate
treatment, which simply means being subject to conditions or disadvantageous
terms other sex was not).
78. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arther Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir.
1977) (determining sex discrimination to be understood as protecting biological
women from discrimination in employment).
79. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (reasoning
that permitting one policy for women and one policy for men does not comply
with Section 703(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires that “persons of like
qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex”).
80. See, e.g., L.A. Dep’t. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978) (finding payment differential was undoubtedly gender-based).
81. See id. at 708 (stating individuals in respective classes do not always share
same characteristics as other members of class).
82. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (defining
“sexual harassment” as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . where ‘such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonable interfering with an individual’s work
13
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found that discrimination because of sex in the workplace was not
restricted to economic or tangible discrimination, but can include
the psychological harms that change the terms and conditions of
the employee’s employment because of an employee’s sex.83  The
Supreme Court further clarified the definition of sexual harass-
ment in Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc. and held that psychological in-
jury is not required to recover under Title VII.84   The Court in
Harris found that Title VII claims are actionable if a plaintiff dem-
onstrates that a reasonable person would find the work environ-
ment hostile or abusive.85
After deciding these seminal cases, the Court then considered
if Title VII’s protection from discrimination on the basis of sex also
applied to same-sex harassment.86  The Supreme Court decided in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. that same-sex harassment is
a viable claim under Title VII.87  The Court in this case reasoned
that there is no justification in the statutory language or the Court’s
precedents for excluding same-sex harassment claims from the pro-
tection of Title VII.88  The Court also importantly asserted that
male-on-male sexual harassment was “assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII.  But
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment’”).
83. See id. at 64 (asserting language of Title VII is not limited to “economic” or
“tangible” discrimination because statute is intended to strike “the entire spec-
trum” of disparate treatment in workplace).
84. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (stating Title
VII is violated “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” and
“[s]uch an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder’s attention on concrete psy-
chological harm, an element Title VII does not require”).
85. See id. at 368 (declaring standard requires objectively hostile or abusive
environment).
86. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir.
1996) (“Accordingly, we hold that a same sex . . . sexual harassment claim may lie
under Title VII where a homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates
against an employee of the same sex.”); see generally Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F.
Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (suggesting same-sex harassment claims are not
cognizable under Title VII).
87. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)
(“[N]othing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . .
sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex.”).
88. See id. at 80 (defending against argument that recognizing same-sex liabil-
ity would turn Title VII into “general civility code” for American workplace).
14
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reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of
our laws . . . by which we are governed.”89
3. Sex Stereotyping and Gender-Based Discrimination
In addition to issues of sexual harassment, courts were tasked
with determining if discrimination based on sex stereotyping consti-
tuted discrimination based on sex.90  The Supreme Court made a
ground-breaking decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that allowed
sex stereotyping to be used as evidence for sex discrimination in the
workplace.91  The Court held that an employer cannot discriminate
against an employee for not conforming to certain stereotypes with-
out discriminating because of sex.92  Therefore, when an employee
suffers from an adverse employment decision because they do not
meet certain societal expectations, the employer can be liable
under Title VII.93
In addressing more recent cases regarding gender identity, cir-
cuit courts have leveraged the reasoning of Price Waterhouse in tan-
dem with the logic of Oncale to find that some same-sex harassment
claims can succeed if the plaintiff shows that they were harassed for
failing to conform to certain gender stereotypes.94  In E.E.O.C. v.
Boh Bros. Constr. Co., LLC, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence that a male supervisor discriminated
against the plaintiff because of his “sex” when the supervisor sub-
jected him to verbal and physical harassment for not being “man
89. See id. at 79 (justifying Court’s interpretation of text of Title VII against
historical backdrop of “sex” discrimination meaning only discrimination against
females).
90. See generally Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978)
(limiting Title VII protections to making equal opportunities for women and men
in workplace); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir.
1977) (asserting sex was based on “anatomical characteristics” and transgender
people do not classify in traditional meaning of “sex”).
91. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (“In the spe-
cific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that
a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”).
92. See id. at 1791 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evalu-
ate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group.”).
93. See id. at 1795 (holding when plaintiff in Title VII case shows that gender
motivated employment decision, defendant can only escape liability if it proves
that it would have made same decision even if it had not taken into account plain-
tiff’s gender).
94. See Alex Reed, Note, Same-Sex Harassment After Boh Brothers, 3 UT. L. REV.
441, 455 (2016) (noting individual does not need to establish gender non-con-
formity to state actionable same-sex harassment claim on basis of gender stereo-
types under Title VII).
15
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enough.”95  This fact pattern could also form the basis of a claim of
discrimination or harassment based on sexual orientation, but
before Bostock, lower courts were divided as to whether sexual orien-
tation discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII.96
4. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Cases
Historically, plaintiffs have failed to convince courts to inter-
pret Title VII to include protections for sexual orientation and
transgender discrimination.97   These cases may have turned out
differently if they were decided after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Price Waterhouse, which held “sex” discrimination to include gen-
der identity, rather than solely anatomy, to be a determinant of sex
under Title VII.98 Price Waterhouse set the tone for sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity jurisprudence; in its wake, circuit courts
acknowledged the harms of discrimination for failing to conform to
gender roles.99  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Schwenk v. Hartford
found that “the initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Hol-
loway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price
Waterhouse.100
95. See E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457-461 (concluding
supervisor discriminated because of sex and it was severe or pervasive enough to be
considered hostile work environment).
96. For further discussion of the courts’ divide on this issue, see infra notes
97-100 and accompanying text.
97. See generally Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir.
1984) (emphasizing Congress never considered broad coverage of homosexuals or
transgenders under Title VII, and if term “sex” as used in Title VII is “to mean
more than biological male or biological female, the new definition must come
from Congress”); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982)
(“Because Congress has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold
that discrimination based on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the purview
of [Title VII].”).
98. See Taylor Flynn, Comment, TRANSforming the Debate: Why We Need to In-
clude Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 392, 395 (2001) (detailing legal shift after Price Waterhouse).
99. See generally Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st
Cir. 2000) (finding sex discrimination may include discriminating against man for
feminine attire); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
Title VII protections extend to males who are deemed feminine).
100. See Katrina C. Rose, 20 years ago, this legal case set the state for the Supreme
Court’s upcoming ruling on trans rights, LGBTQ NATION (Jan. 10, 2020), https://
www.lgbtqnation.com/2020/01/20-years-ago-legal-case-set-stage-supreme-courts-
upcoming-ruling-trans-rights/ [https://perma.cc/P5F8-5ECJ] (discussing depar-
ture from old anti-trans Title VII decisions).
16
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C. Title VII Informing Title IX Policies
The language of Title IX closely follows that of Title VII be-
cause both statutes can be used to combat sex discrimination.101
However, Title VII is concerned with discrimination in the work-
place, whereas Title IX prohibits discrimination in educational pro-
grams or institutions that receive money from the federal
government.102  Courts historically have looked to Title VII to in-
form their opinions on Title IX claims because Title VII has case
law that “dictates the prohibition of sex discrimination.”103  Fur-
ther, because the enabling clause of Title VII and Title IX are indis-
tinguishable, “court decisions under one law typically impact how
the other law will be interpreted, i.e., court decisions under one law
can set precedents for the interpretation of the other.”104
D. Transgender Athletes’ Rights
Transgender participation in athletic competition is not a
novel debate.105  It is one that has sparked controversy and has cre-
101. See Kendyl L. Green, Comment, Title VII, Title IX, or Both?, 14 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (describing similarities between two statutes).
102. See id. (discussing differences between Title VII and Title IX).
103. See id. (reinforcing interconnection between Title VII and Title IX); see
generally Oona R. S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Title
VII to teacher on harassment claim); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty.
Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating Title VII has persuasive authority in
Title IX claims); Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.
1993) (reasoning Title VII is “most appropriate analogue” of Title IX’s standards).
But see Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding Title VII stan-
dards are not authoritative in class action brought by female athletes against
university).
104. See Bernice Resnick Sandler, Title IX: How We Got It and What a Difference it
Made, 55 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 473, 479 (2007) (noting enabling clause of Title
IX says “[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational
program receiving Federal financial assistance”).  These words cover every activity
in an educational institution, including sports. See id. (acknowledging enabling
clause covers everything unless there is specific exemption, such as “private under-
graduate admissions, the social activities of fraternities and sororities, single sex
dormitories, and certain youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts and Girl
Scouts”).  After Title IX was passed, “a new era had begun, but few realized that
this was a landmark bill which would affect millions of girls and women and
change our schools and colleges forever.” See id. at 480 (observing impact Title IX
has on athletics and doors Title IX has opened for female athletes).
105. See, e.g., Ruth Padawer, The Humiliating Practice of Sex-Testing Female Ath-
letes, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/maga-
zine/the-humiliating-practice-of-sex-testing-female-athletes.html [https://
perma.cc/26R4-EUS8] (describing sports history fraught with disputes about ath-
letes’ gender identity).  During the 1936 Berlin Olympics, two runners were ru-
mored to be “male imposters” because of their remarkable athletic talents, and
after the track race, the German Olympics examined a runner’s genitalia to con-
17
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ated “deeply divided advocates who are usually in agreement when
it comes to female sports, including lawyers, women’s group lead-
ers, athletes, and parents.”106  A review of recent cases and the
NCAA transgender athlete regulatory policy evidences that striking
the balance between fairness and inclusion in the transgender
sports debate is a difficult task and a goal that is far from being
reached.107
1. Soule v. Connecticut Association of Sports
Before the Bostock decision, three high school female athletes
sued the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (CIAC)
for adopting a new policy that allowed transgender student athletes
to compete on the team of their “preferred gender identity.”108
The students filed the complaint in federal court, claiming that
they were denied the opportunity for fair competition under Title
IX.109  In Connecticut, two individuals assigned male at birth, but
identifying as females, won fifteen women’s state championship
firm she was female. See id. (noting early example of gender identity dispute in
sports).  Shortly after the Berlin Olympics, international sports administrators
started requiring females to bring “femininity certificates” to confirm their sex. See
id. (highlighting concern of “masculine” athletes in female sports).  In the 1950s,
the Soviet Union had major female athlete success in the Olympics, and rumors
were spread that the female athletes “were men who bound their genitals to rake
in more wins.” See id. (showcasing attitudes that superior female athletes must be
men).  By the 1960s, international sports officials mandated a genital check of
every woman competing in international games. See id. (noting this practice was
coined “nude parade” where women had to appear in front of panel of doctors
with underpants down to get examined).  After complaints about the genital
checks, international officials developed a “chromosome test” to “root out not only
imposters but also intersex athletes, who, Olympic officials said, needed to be
barred to ensure fair play.” See id. (relying on science to determine if athlete “was
female enough” to participate).
106. See Kathleen Megan, Transgender Sports Debate Polarizes Women’s Advocates,
CT MIRROR (July 22, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/07/22/transgender-issues-
polarizes-womens-advocates-a-conundrum/ [https://perma.cc/BT34-36D4] (not-
ing polarization of views on transgender sports debate).
107. For further discussion of recent issues highlighting the diversity of opin-
ions in the transgender sports debate, see infra notes 108-134 and accompanying
text.
108. See Connecticut Students Sue Over Trans-Athlete School Policy, CATH. NEWS
AGENCY (Feb. 13, 2020), https://angelusnews.com/news/nation/connecticut-stu-
dents-sue-over-trans-athlete-school-policy/ [https://perma.cc/V6QL-K9FV] [here-
inafter Connecticut Students Sue] (acknowledging new Connecticut Athletic
Conference policy that does not segregate sports by biological sex).
109. See Christina Maxouris, 3 Connecticut High School Girls are Suing Over Policy
That Allows Trans Athletes to Compete in Girls’ Sports, CNN (Feb. 14, 2020), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/02/14/us/transgender-athletes-connecticut-lawsuit/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/X45D-Q8RV] (“The policy, they say in the suit, re-
sults in “boys” displacing girls in competitive track events in Connecticut.”).
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/5
2021] STRIKING THE BALANCE OF FAIRNESS AND INCLUSION 433
track titles.110  Furthermore, one transgender female set ten state
records that were held previously by ten different girls.111
In March of 2020, the United States Department of Justice
wrote a statement of interest against the CIAC policy, arguing that
“sex” in Title IX does not encompass transgender status.112  Fur-
ther, the Department argued against making biological females
compete against transgender females, as it “deprives those women
of the single-sex athletic competitions that are one of the marquee
accomplishments of Title IX.”113  The CIAC argued that their poli-
cies are not subject to Title IX.114  In May 2020, the Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR) concluded that the CIAC
and other Connecticut school districts violated Title IX by adopting
the transgender-participation policy and discriminating against fe-
male athletes.115  After Bostock was decided, OCR doubled down on
its position that transgender participation policies violate Title
IX.116  A New York Times report released on Sept 18, 2020 commu-
110. See Gillian R. Brassil & Jeré Longman, Who Should Compete in Women’s
Sports? There are “Two Almost Irreconcilable Positions”, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/sports/transgender-athletes-womens-
sports-idaho.html [https://perma.cc/5W5D-B7SF] (observing number of titles
transgender sprinters have won).
111. See Connecticut Students Sue, supra note 108 (discussing 2019 track champi-
onship results and track records held by transgender runners).
112. See The Department of Justice Files Statement of Interest in Title IX Women’s’
Equal Opportunities Case, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-statement-interest-title-ix-
womens-equal-opportunities-case [https://perma.cc/5458-F5GD] (setting forth
opinion on Title VII correlation with Title IX).
113. See id. (emphasizing Title IX’s core purpose is to give women equal ath-
letic opportunity in schools and arguing this is done by establishing separate ath-
letic teams for men and women that are on equal footing).
114. See Associated Press, State Athletics Body Argues It Is Not Subject to Title IX,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2020-03-
19/state-athletics-body-argues-it-is-not-subject-to-title-ix?context=amp (arguing
CIAC is exempt from complying with Title IX because it does not receive federal
funding).
115. See Valerie Richardson, Connecticut Transgender-Sports Policy Discriminates
against Girls: Feds, WASH. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/2019/06/19/girls-say-connecticuts-transgender-athlete-policy-violates-title-
ix-file-federal-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/HPD9-KT3F] (stating districts and
CIAC violated Title IX because “they treated student-athletes differently based on
sex, by denying benefits and opportunities to female students that were available to
male students”).
116. See Letter from United States Department of Education to Hartford Pub-
lic Schools, Glastonbury Public Schools, Canton Public Schools, Connecticut Inter-
scholastic Athletic Conference, Danbury Public Schools, Bloomfield Public
Schools and Cromwell Public Schools, Office for Civil Rights (Aug. 31, 2020) (on
file with author), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investiga-
tions/more/01194025-a2.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW27-KKUH] (“Even if Bostock
applied to Title IX – a question the Supreme Court expressly declined to address –
19
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nicated OCR’s threat to several Connecticut schools that it would
withhold millions of dollars if the schools do not withdraw from the
CIAC because by “permitting the participation of biologically male
students in girls’ interscholastic track” the CIAC “has denied female
student athletes benefits and opportunities.117
2. Hecox v. Little
The OCR letters sent in regard to Soule in Connecticut left an
Idaho federal district judge unconvinced that transgender girls par-
ticipating in high school athletics discriminates against biological
female athletes under Title IX.118  In August of 2020, the judge in
Hecox v. Little issued a temporary injunction against the nation’s
first state law that prohibited transgender females from playing on
biological girls’ and women’s teams.119  Judge Nye believed that
“[t]he OCR Letter is . . . of questionable validity given the Supreme
Court’s recent holding” in Bostock.120  Judge Nye also reasoned that
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and high
school sports authorities in other states have allowed transgender
females to participate in female sports, as long as they undergo tes-
tosterone suppression treatment for a given amount of time.121
The Hecox case involved a transgender college student, Lindsay
Hecox, who wanted to run on the women’s track team at Boise
State University.122  She sued Idaho Governor Brad Little for sign-
its reasoning would only confirm that Title IX does not permit a biologically male
student to compete against females on a sex-segregated team or in a sex-segregated
league.”).
117. See Broadwater & Green, supra note 14 (reporting Education Depart-
ment prepared to withhold eighteen million dollars of grants to Connecticut
school districts if districts continue to allow transgender students to choose teams
they want to compete on).
118. See Richard Wolf, From bathrooms to ball fields, transgender rights advance in
wake of Supreme Court ruling ,  USA TODAY (Sept. 3, 2020), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/09/03/transgender-rights-supreme-
court-win-propels-lower-court-victories/5647161002/ [https://perma.cc/KA5N-
8U78] (explaining Judge David Nye “cited the Bostock decision as reason to dis-
count an Education Department warning that Lindsay Hecox’s participation in
sports at Boise State University would violate federal law”).
119. See Mark Walsh, Judge Blocks Idaho Law Limiting Sports Participation by
Transgender Females, EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 17, 2020), https://blogs.edweek.org/
edweek/school_law/2020/08/judge_blocks_idaho_law_that_li.html [https://
perma.cc/3KMX-WG3K] (describing  Judge Nye’s decision in Hecox case).
120. See id. (recognizing Judge Nye’s dismissal of OCR letter).
121. See id. (presenting Judge Nye’s rationale behind temporary injunction).
For further discussion of the NCAA’s policy on transgender athletes’ participation,
see infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
122. See Hecox v. Little, ACLU 100 YEARS (Apr. 15, 2020), https://
www.aclu.org/cases/hecox-v-little [https://perma.cc/6RDS-Y79K] (describing
plaintiff’s reason for bringing suit).
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ing a law that imposes an outright ban on transgender participation
in women’s sports.123  The ACLU of Idaho represented Ms. Hecox
in this action, arguing that the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act vio-
lates federal law because “it discriminates on the basis of sex and
transgender status and invades fundamental privacy rights.”124  The
court enjoined the State of Idaho from enforcing this law without
deciding whether the law violates Title IX.125  Alliance Defending
Freedom, who also represented the female athletes in Connecticut,
filed its appeal of the decision to halt enforcement of the Idaho law
with the Ninth Circuit.126
3. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
In 2011, the NCAA published guidelines that set forth how the
NCAA would permit the inclusion of transgender student-athletes
in college athletics.127  These guidelines remain the current policy
for the NCAA.128  According to the guidelines, the NCAA’s policy is
that transgender males may participate on a men’s team in the
NCAA, but transgender females must take testosterone suppression
to be able to compete on a women’s team.129  An NCAA spokesper-
123. See id. (noting Idaho was first state to ban transgender athletes from
participating on sports teams with Fairness in Women’s Sports Act).
124. See Complaint at 52, Hecox v. Little, No. 1:20-cv-184 (D. Idaho Aug. 17,
2020) (alleging Idaho law is not compliant with Title IX and is acting
unconstitutionally).
125. See Memorandum and Decision Order at 87, Hecox v. Little, No. 1:20-cv-
184 (D. Idaho Aug. 17, 2020) (“Because the Court finds Plaintiffs are likely to
succeed in establishing the Act is unconstitutional as currently written, it must is-
sue a preliminary injunction at this time pending trial on the merits.”).
126. See Keith Ridler, Group appeals US judge’s Idaho transgender sports ban ruling,
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/relig-
ion/christian-group-appeals-idaho-transgender-sports-ban-ruling/2020/09/17/
4055e6bc-f8fa-11ea-85f7-5941188a98cd_story.html [https://perma.cc/GD2Y-
ZD3D] (reporting Alliance Defending Freedom is appealing district court’s deci-
sion to grant temporary injunction, which allows “transgender athletes in Idaho
who want to participate in sports that match their gender identity can do so while
the case proceeds in court”).
127. See Maggie Ryan, The NCAA Trans Athlete Policy was Groundbreaking in 2011
– But in 2020, More Must Be Done, POP SUGAR (July 1, 2020), https://
www.popsugar.com/fitness/how-ncaa-policy-for-transgender-athletes-can-evolve-
47583204 [https://perma.cc/CF9U-Y7MT] (describing NCAA’s first attempt at
policy to mandate transgender athletes’ participation in college sports).
128. See Rachel Stark-Mason, A Time of Transition, NCAA CHAMPION MAGAZINE,
(2019), http://www.ncaa.org/static/champion/a-time-of-transition/ [https://
perma.cc/D2LC-RXX5] (“Resources to guide the participation of transgender ath-
letes in competition are scarce . . . [t]he NCAA is just one organization seeking a
solution as it works to update its guide for transgender student-athletes to better
assist schools and conferences.”).
129. See Office of Inclusion, NCAA Inclusion of Transgender Student-Athletes,
NCAA  (Aug. 2011), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Trans-
21
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son for the 2011 policy noted that the policy “sought fair opportuni-
ties for student-athletes from diverse backgrounds while ensuring
that women’s sports would be equitably conducted.”130
Currently, the NCAA policy does not limit the number of trans-
gender student-athletes who may participate on a team or at an in-
stitution.131  Further, all student athletes are subject to the same
division-specific financial aid legislation.132  If Bostock applies to Ti-
tle IX, the NCAA’s current policy, which bars female transgender
athletes from participating on women’s teams until the athlete com-
pletes one year of suppression treatment, might be challenged.133
If this policy is successfully challenged and the NCAA does not
change their transgender participation policy, transgender female
athletes who do not undergo suppression treatments may partici-
pate on women’s teams with the same opportunities for roster spots
and scholarships as biological female athletes on women’s teams.134
IV. A PLAY-BY-PLAY: THE SUPREME COURT’S RATIONALE IN
BOSTOCK
The Supreme Court ruled in a 6-3 decision that Title VII pro-
hibits sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.135
From this decision, the Court resolved the circuit split by reversing
the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit (in Bostock) and affirming the
gender_Handbook_2011_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR48-KKZY] (stating “A
trans male student-athlete who is not taking testosterone related to gender transi-
tion may participate on a men’s or women’s team” and “a trans female transgender
student-athlete who is not taking hormone treatments related to gender transition
may not compete on a women’s team”).
130. See Ryan, supra note 127 (explaining rationale for NCAA policy).
131. See E-mail from Jean Merrill, NCAA Director of Inclusion, to Jackie Gil-
len, Staff Writer, Villanova Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (Oct. 21, 2020,
9:45 AM) (on file with author) (explaining NCAA does not have policy for how
many transgender athletes may participate on one same-sex team or at one
institution).
132. See id. (setting forth no difference in scholarship eligibility for trans-
gender athletes).
133. See Gregory A. Marino & Andrew L. Lee, Bostock: How Will the Supreme
Court’s Landmark Civil Rights Decision Play Out in Sports?, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/08/bos-
tock-supreme-courts-civil-rights-sports [https://perma.cc/H66B-HC57] (predict-
ing practice of testosterone suppression treatment “might be susceptible to
challenge under an extension of Bostock, and stakeholders should consider and
prepare for the potential need to make changes”).
134. See Mason, supra note 128 (“Transgender athletes are competing at all
levels of sport, from youth club programs to professional leagues . . . [y]et even as
more transgender athletes get into the game, sports leaders, competitors, and fans
around the globe still grapple with how to keep contests fair for all.”).
135. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020) (noting Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bostock).
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judgements of the Second and Sixth Circuits (in Zarda and Stephens
respectively).136  The Supreme Court started its analysis of Title VII
with an examination of the ordinary public meaning of “sex” and
concluded with a review of judicial precedent.137  The Court ulti-
mately determined Title VII’s statutory language and judicial his-
tory provide that “sexual orientation and gender identity are
inextricably bound up with sex . . . and that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity involves the applica-
tion of sex based rules.”138
A. The Ordinary Public Meaning of “Sex” Under Title VII
It is general practice for the Supreme Court to interpret a stat-
ute in accordance with the ordinary public meaning of the statute’s
terms when it was enacted.139  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits an employer from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”140  The main statutory term at is-
sue in this case is “sex,” and the parties conceded that the term
historically referred to the “status as either male or female as deter-
136. See id. at 1754 (emphasizing importance of Supreme Court’s decision in
this case resolving circuit court split whether sexual orientation and transgender
discrimination is discrimination because of sex); see also Carlos Arevalo, US Supreme
Court to Decide Title VII Sexual Orientation/Transgender Discrimination Cases, JD Supra
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/us-supreme-court-to-decide-
title-vii-98146/ [https://perma.cc/NEM7-L2GZ] (stating circuit split “set up the
stage” for Supreme Court to address issue).
137. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747 (detailing Supreme Court’s method and
analysis of interpreting Title VII because of sex discrimination).
138. See id. (describing Supreme Court’s rationale for its holding); see also
Sheridan King & Joshua Xavier, Defining Sex – The U.S. Supreme Court Finds That
Sexual Orientation and Transgender Status Are Protected Under Title VII, JD Supra (June
26, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/defining-sex-the-u-s-supreme-
court-41158/ [https://perma.cc/L9MD-U8RT] (explaining Supreme Court’s deci-
sion makes clear that “an employment decision made on the basis of an em-
ployee’s homosexuality or transgender status is an employment decision made on
the basis of an employee’s sex and is thereby prohibited by Title VII”).
139. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (stating Court normally interprets statue in
accord “with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment
. . . [if] judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms
. . . we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the
people’s representatives”); see generally David A. Strauss, Comment, Why Plain Mean-
ing, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1568, 1565 (1997) (observing Supreme Court’s reli-
ance on looking at “plain” or “public” meaning of statute).
140. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (quoting Title VII’s language).
23
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mined by reproductive biology.”141  However, to determine the or-
dinary public meaning of “sex” the Court had to look beyond the
historical definition and discern what “sex” means in the context of
Title VII .142
The Court recognized that Title VII prohibits employers from
taking an adverse employment action or discriminating against an
employee “because of their sex.”143  This phrase implies a tradi-
tional standard of but-for causation, which means if the employer
would not have made their decision if the plaintiff were not of a
certain sex, the employer may be liable.144  The Court then ex-
amined the ordinary public meaning of the terms “discriminate”
and “discriminate against” which meant to “treat an individual
worse than others who are similarly situated.”145  The meaning of
“individual” is the same as it was in 1964, which is “[a] particular
being as distinguished from a class, species, or collection.”146
B. The Court’s Interpretation of the Statutory Terms
After examining the ordinary public meaning of the terms in
Title VII, the Court argued that a “straight forward rule emerges”
which is “an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires
an individual employee in part on sex.”147  Applying this rule to the
facts of this case, the Court found that “it is impossible to discrimi-
nate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.”148  The Court
offered a hypothetical to drive home the point that to discriminate
against someone for their transgender status or homosexuality is to
141. See id. at 1739 (acknowledging difference in opinion about definition of
“sex,” but parties conceded that historically it meant biological sex of individual).
142. See id. (reasoning definition of “sex” is not only thing Court considers
when determining ordinary public meaning of statutory term).
143. See id. (emphasizing statutory term in question).
144. See John D. Rue, Returning to the Rotts of the Bramble Bush: The “But-For” Test
Regains Primacy in Casual Analysis in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2685 (2003) (stating “but-for” inquiry
“asks the finder of fact to determine whether the harm would have come to the
plaintiff, had the defendant not acted (or failed to act) in breach of her duty”).
145. See id. (analyzing ordinary public meaning of other Title VII terms).
146. See id. (continuing to determine ordinary public meaning of pertinent
statutory terms).
147. See Bostock,140 S. Ct. at 1741 (proposing that ordinary public meanings of
terms provide straightforward statutory interpretation of what “because of sex”
under Title VII means).
148. See id. (declaring sexual orientation or transgender discrimination is dis-
crimination under Title VII because discrimination is based on sex).
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intentionally treat them differently because of their sex.149  That is
because when an employer fires an employee under these grounds,
there are two causal factors that may be in play: “both the individ-
ual’s sex and something else (the sex to which the individual is at-
tracted to or with which the individual identifies).”150  Thus, when
an employer discriminates on these grounds the employer inten-
tionally relies on sex in its decision-making, which is forbidden by
Title VII.151
C. Judicial Precedent Interpreting “Sex” under Title VII
To support its conclusions, the Court revisited three leading
“because of sex” discrimination precedents, Phillips, Manhart, and
Oncale, to confirm the Court’s interpretation of the plain meaning
of Title VII.”152  The Court discerned lessons from these cases that
the Court applied to the facts presented in Bostock.153  The first les-
son the Court offers is that it is irrelevant what an employer may call
or label a discriminatory practice if the practice intentionally dis-
criminates against that individual in part because of sex.154  The
next lesson is that a plaintiff’s sex does not need to be the primary
cause of the employer’s adverse action.155  The final lesson the
149. See id. at 1742 (“Consider an employer with a policy of firing any woman
he discovers to be a Yankees fan. Carrying out that rule because an employee is a
woman and a fan of the Yankees is firing “because of sex” if the employer would
have tolerated the same allegiance in a male employee.”); see generally Alexa Brad-
ley, Bostock v. Clayton County: An Unexpected Victory, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG
(July 17, 2020), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2020/07/bostock-v-clay-
ton-county-an-unexpected-victory/ [https://perma.cc/9H7U-LR55] (commenting
on hypothetical saying, “[the] hypothetical perfectly demonstrates the inseparable
link between one’s ‘sex’ and ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘sex’ and ‘transgender
status’”).
150. See Bostock,140 S. Ct. at 1742 (finding when employer discriminates
against homosexuals or transgenders there are two factors at play, one of them
being sex).
151. See id. (concluding employer intentionally discriminates against some-
one because of sex when employer discriminates against employee for being ho-
mosexual or transgender).
152. See id. at 1743 (“All that the statute’s plain terms suggest, this Court’s
cases have already confirmed. Consider three of our leading precedents.”).  For
further discussion of the Court’s three leading precedents, see supra notes 79-89
and accompanying text.
153. See id. (using past cases to suggest legal terms in Title VII have plain and
settled meanings that support Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Bostock).
154. See id. (“First, it’s irrelevant what an employer might call its discrimina-
tory practice.”).  The Court references Manhart and Phillips to say that labels and
intentions do not make a difference if a practice is discriminatory or not. See id.
(clarifying practice that is neutrally labeled may still be discriminatory).
155. See id. at 1744 (explaining in Phillips, Manhart, and Oncale, Court has
found that sex just needs to be factor in employer’s decision and does not need to
be sole cause of adverse action).
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Court emphasizes is an employer cannot escape liability for treating
males and females comparably as groups.156
V. PLAY BY THE RULES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BOSTOCK
The Bostock decision was a battle between textualists.157   One
commentator stated that Neil Gorsuch and five other Justices in the
majority took a “formalistic textualist” approach which focused on
the statutory language of Title VII and downplayed the policy con-
cerns or consequences of the case.158  The dissent in this case of-
fered a more “flexible textualism” approach that allowed the
interpretation of Title VII to include considerations such as policy,
social context, and practical consequences.159
Before this decision, academics focused more on the differ-
ence between “textualism,” “originalism,” and “purposivism,” rather
than the divisions within textualism.160  The Court’s ruling in Bostock
highlights the tensions within textualism because Justice Neil Gor-
such, who authored the majority’s opinion, and Justice Brett Kava-
naugh, who authored a dissenting opinion in the case, both have
been known to be “committed textualists” and both were appointed
by former President Donald Trump.161  The Bostock case shocked
156. See id. (finding even if employer subjects all male and females to rule
that promotes equality at group level, it fails Title VII if it is discriminatory at indi-
vidual level).
157. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARVARD L.
REV. 1, 2 (Sept. 14, 2020) (describing two different “textualist” interpretations at
play in Bostock).
158. See id. (noting majority did not include policy appeals and legislative his-
tory in its analysis).
159. See id. (differentiating majority’s formalistic textualism and dissent’s flex-
ible textualism, which includes other factors to interpret text of Title VII).
160. See id. at 3 (“Scholarship on statutory interpretation has largely over-
looked the divisions within textualism.”).  Textualists identify and enforce the “ob-
jective” or “plain” meaning of the statutory text. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Comment,
What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 348, 352 (2005) (explaining textualism as theory
of statutory interpretation).  Originalists generally contend that the “original in-
tentions of the Framers should guide constitutional interpretation.” See Lawrence
B. Solum, Comment, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, GEO. UNIV. L. CTR. 1, 5 (2011) (explaining originalism as theory of statu-
tory interpretation).  Purposivists tend to argue that “given the complexity of the
legislative process, Congress cannot be expected to put everything in the text, and
thus judges should interpret a statute so as to fulfill its overall aims and goals.” See
Grove, supra note 157, at 3 (explaining purposivism as theory of statutory
interpretation).
161. See Ilya Shapiro, After Bostock, We’re All Textualists Now, NAT’L REV. (June
15, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/supreme-court-decision-bos-
tock-v-clayton-county-we-are-all-textualists-now/ [https://perma.cc/2FHR-FAH8]
(observing both Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh were appointed by President
Trump).
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the nation because many commenters observed that textualism tra-
ditionally upholds conservative political viewpoints, yet this decision
is not considered a “win” by many conservatives.162
Between formalistic textualism and flexible textualism, the
Court opted to adopt a formalistic textualism approach to inter-
preting Title VII in Bostock.163  When the Court turns to the plain
meaning of Title VII rather than loose appeals to policy concerns,
the Court sets guidelines for clearer and more transparent statutory
analysis, and in turn helps protect the institutional legitimacy of the
judiciary.164  The Supreme Court’s decision that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination is not surprising.165  It follows naturally from
162. See Steve Sanders, Bostock: A Textualist Trump Appointee Delivers a Landmark
Victory for LGBT Equality, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 15, 2020), https://
www.acslaw.org/expertforum/bostock-a-textualist-trump-appointee-delivers-a-
landmark-victory-for-lgbt-equality/ [https://perma.cc/4UYH-FCXW] (“If Gor-
such’s opinion doesn’t scramble our understandings about what it means to be a
‘conservative’ versus a ‘liberal’ justice, it does at least show that those labels can be
an oversimplification.”); see also Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RSCH. CENTER
(May 14, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-
marriage/ [https://perma.cc/UTJ3-FY8L ] (“Three-quarters of Democrats and
Democratic-leaning independents (75%) and fewer than half of Republicans and
Republican leaners (44%) favor same sex marriage.”).
163. For further discussion of why adopting formalistic textualism was the
right decision, see infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
164. See Grove, supra note 157, at 32 (asserting formalistic textualism is “more
rule-bound method that promises to better constrain judicial discretion and thus a
judge’s proclivity to rules in favor of the wishes of the political faction that pro-
pelled her into power”).  It is important for the courts to maintain legitimacy by
guarding its reputation of judicial impartiality to the public so that the public con-
tinues to respect the court’s authority in making decisions. See also Peter Irons, A
People’s History of the Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/has-supreme-court-lost-its-legitimacy-
ncna966211 [https://perma.cc/E7ZT-VXL7] (“Rather, what matters is whether
the public continues to believe the court has the authority to make decisions – and
whether those decisions are obeyed by both the debate’s winners and losers.”).
Maintaining an image of impartiality has become increasingly difficult in recent
decades because politics in the United States have become more partisan and
prone to gridlock. See How America’s Supreme Court became so politicised, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/09/15/how-ameri-
cas-supreme-court-became-so-politicised [https://perma.cc/R3TR-DC4M ] (ac-
knowledging Congress recently becoming more partisan).  Problems that in the
past may have been settled legislatively are instead being decided by courts, and in
the past four decades the Court has had to settle some of the most divisive political
issues in American history. See id. (establishing why courts are viewed as more
political than they once were).  In addition, since the 1980s, it has become com-
monplace that presidents appoint judges that will decide cases in accord with the
president’s side of the partisan divide.  See id. (pointing out success of president’s
selections in justices who will decide cases that align with president’s political
party).
165. See Russell Moore, After the Bostock Supreme Court Case, KY. TODAY (June 15,
2020), https://www.kentuckytoday.com/stories/after-the-bostock-supreme-court-
27
Gillen: Striking the Balance of Fairness and Inclusion: The Future of Wom
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021
442 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 415
the Court’s interpretation of the plain language of the statute over
the years because the Court on multiple occasions has recognized
“sex” to mean more than the biological distinction between males
and females.166  Beginning with Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the
Supreme Court held that sexual harassment in the workplace is a
violation of Title VII, when Title VII does not reference sexual har-
assment at all.167  The Supreme Court then decided in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. that same-sex harassment is a viable
claim under Title VII.168 Also, the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins held that an employer cannot discriminate against an em-
ployee for not conforming to certain stereotypes without
discriminating because of sex.169  It is clear from its judicial prece-
dents that the Court has been willing to recognize that claims that
were not specifically contemplated by Congress may still be actiona-
ble under Title VII.170  In addition, for many courts, “homosexual-
ity and gender nonconformity are seen as interchangeable
concepts.”171  Further, applying the Court’s precedent to trans-
gendered individuals, it can be argued that “[d]iscrimination based
on gender identity . . . is also a form of sex stereotyping.”172
When adopting the formalistic textualist approach in Bostock,
the Court opined that the text of the law is more important to con-
sider than policy appeals to the consequences this decision could
have on many other federal and state discrimination statutes.173
case,26403 [https://perma.cc/TW9U-6WPB] (“The Supreme Court decision
should hardly be surprising, given how much has changed culturally on the mean-
ings of sex and sexuality.”).
166. For further discussion of why the Court’s decision is unsurprising, see
infra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
167. For further discussion of Meritor Savings Bank facts, see supra notes 82-83
and accompanying text.
168. For further discussion of Oncale facts, see supra notes 87-89 and accompa-
nying text.
169. For further discussion of Price Waterhouse facts, see supra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
170. See Verona & Monks, supra note 77, at 92 (“The Supreme Court has de-
emphasized altogether the role of congressional intent in interpreting Title VII.”).
171. See id. at 88 (making argument that “[i]t is fairly simple, then, to see why
Title VII should protect effeminate men and masculine women from workplace
discrimination”).
172. See id. at 89 (“Since transgendered people identify with the biological sex
opposite than that which they were born with, they are, by definition, gender
nonconforming.”).
173. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1745 (“They warn, too, about
consequences that might follow a ruling for the employees. But none of these
contentions about what the employers think the law was meant to do, or should
do, allow us to ignore the law as it is.”).  In addressing the dissent’s concerns about
the consequences to follow the decision, the Court said, “[w]hether other policies
and practices might or might not qualify as unlawful discrimination or find justifi-
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Thus, the Court’s decision garnered institutional legitimacy in the
eyes of the public because it was non-partisan and rooted in the
interpretation of the text of the law.174  However, inevitably, the ef-
fects of this decision are already at play in other contexts outside of
employment discrimination, and lower courts are left without gui-
dance of how to apply the Court’s Title VII definition to other fed-
eral and state statutes that prohibit sex discrimination.175
VI. A GAME CHANGER: WOMEN’S SPORTS AFTER BOSTOCK
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock has certainly reignited
the fight over transgender athletes’ rights.176  In the wake of Bostock,
legislators and attorneys are engaging in high-profile Title VII and
Title IX arguments addressing their impact on transgender and
transitioning athletes and their ability to compete in athletics.177
The Court’s decision may provide female transgender professional
athletes a right to compete against biological female athletes under
Title VII.178  Furthermore, due to the close links between Title VII
and Title IX, there will likely be implications for this decision in
amateur women’s sports.179  This Section will briefly discuss the po-
cations under other provisions of Title VII are questions for future cases, not
these.” See id. at 1753 (deciding only on facts presented and not appealing to pol-
icy concerns offered by dissent).
174. See Ted Barrett et al., Key GOP Senators Have No Qualms with Supreme
Court’s Decision to Ban LGBTQ Discrimination in the Workplace, CNN (June 15, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/15/politics/gop-senators-reaction-supreme-court-
ruling/index.html [https://perma.cc/R95W-HQRT] (noting members from Re-
publican and Democratic parties praising decision).
175. For further discussion of the present impact of Bostock, see infra notes
176-202 and accompanying text.
176. See Julie Kleigman, Idaho Banned Trans Athletes From Women’s Sports. She’s
Fighting Back, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 30, 2020), https://www.si.com/sports-il-
lustrated/2020/06/30/idaho-transgender-ban-fighting-back [https://perma.cc/
4G9C-UVPN] (recognizing Bostock decision has changed legal framework advo-
cates can use to challenge policies that exclude transgender athletes from compet-
ing in sports).
177. For further discussion of the Title VII and Title IX arguments recently
brought concerning transgender athletes’ rights, see supra notes 108-134 and ac-
companying text.
178. See Andrew Lee & Gregory Marino, Bostock: How Will the Supreme Court’s
Landmark Civil Rights Decision Play Out in Sports, JD SUPRA (Aug. 10, 2020), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/bostock-how-will-the-supreme-court-s-25461/ [https:/
/perma.cc/ATH3-CJH9] (stating Bostock will have practical and maybe legal ramifi-
cations for women’s professional sports teams).
179. See Greta Anderson, Far Reaching Consequences, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June
16, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/16/landmark-su-
preme-court-ruling-could-redefine-title-ix [https://perma.cc/7K3K-5S37] (setting
forth potential for litigation in these two areas of sports because of Court’s deci-
sion in Bostock).
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tential impact the Bostock decision may have in the professional
sports world under Title VII.180  Then, this Section will delve more
into the issue of whether the Bostock holding applies to Title IX.181
Many scholars who are tracking this area of the law believe Title
IX’s interaction with transgender rights will be an issue that will
likely move up to the Supreme Court.182
A. Title VII Impact on Women’s Sports
The interpretation of Title VII  “because of sex” discrimination
in the workplace was a monumental decision for LGBTQ employ-
ees who no longer need to be afraid of an adverse employment
action because of their sexual orientation or transgender status.183
The same logic applies in the world of professional sports teams.184
No women’s leagues exclude transgender individuals from partici-
pating, but some leagues require limits on testosterone levels.185
After Bostock, testosterone testing policies may be a ground for
transgender individuals to bring a disparate impact claim.186  This
may permit transgender females to play on professional women’s
180. For further discussion of the Title VII implications Bostock may have on
professional sports, see infra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
181. For further discussion of Bostock impacting Title IX sex discrimination
claims, see infra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
182. For further discussion of scholars predicting this issue will move up to
the Supreme Court, see infra note 200-202 and accompanying text.
183. See Emmett Witkovsky-Eldred, Supreme Court Delivers Major Victory to
LGBTQ Employees, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (June 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
2020/06/15/863498848/supreme-court-delivers-major-victory-to-lgbtq-employees
[https://perma.cc/A88X-XMA] (finding ruling historic because nearly half
United States does not have legal protections for LGBTQ employees, and now
federal law affords LGBTQ protections).
184. See Kiana Thelma Devara, Love is love, sports are sports: Title VII and its effect
on sports, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (July 2, 2020), https://www.dailycal.org/2020/07/02/
love-is-love-sports-are-sports-title-vii-and-its-effect-on-sports/ [https://perma.cc/
2S32-KRZS] (arguing sports are no different than other employment settings, and
Bostock decision allows professional athletes to not fear discrimination for homo-
sexuality or transgender status).
185. See Michael Pavitt, IOC confirms existing guidelines on transgender athlete eligi-
bility to remain for Tokyo 2020, INSIDE THE GAMES, (Mar. 3, 2020), https://
www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1091417/ioc-guidelines-transgender-tokyo-2020
[https://perma.cc/R5BX-SZXW] (observing International Olympic Committee
guidelines mandate female transgender athletes’ total testosterone levels to re-
main under certain threshold to minimize any advantage in women’s competi-
tion); Trans female athletes must lower testosterone levels, IAAF rules, BBC SPORT, (Oct.
14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/50049449 [https://perma.cc/
NER6-SW76]  (stating IIAF adopted policy to limit levels of natural testosterone in
trans female athletes).
186. See Marino & Lee, supra note 133 (“In a post-Bostock world, however, such
limitations – however well meaning – could conceivably qualify as a disparate treat-
ment of transgendered applicants.”).
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teams “regardless of testosterone levels or other physiological traits
generally considered relevant to fair play.”187
B. Title IX Impact on Women’s Sports
After the enactment of Title IX, athletics became a major
source of controversy because males and females are expected to
compete in the classroom but are segregated in competitive
sports.188  The main justification for the segregation of men and
women’s sports is “to maintain competitive fairness and promotion
of broad and equal participation.”189  Justice Alito warned in his
dissent in Bostock that applying the same Title VII definition of “sex”
to Title IX could “undermine one of that law’s greatest achieve-
ments, giving young women an equal opportunity to participate in
sports.190  The director of the Independent Women’s Law Center
said the decision was “a terrible day for women’s sports.”191
Title IX prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from
discriminating because of sex, but is silent whether because of sex
includes gender identity or discrimination against transgender stu-
dents.192  If the Bostock decision applies to Title IX, then it could
have an immediate impact on present and future legal battles over
the inclusion of transgender athletes in high school and college
187. See id. (raising questions of fairness that future courts have to balance
with inclusion of transgender athletes).
188. See Brittany K. Puzey, Title IX and Baseball: How the Contact Sports Exemption
Denies Women Equal Opportunity to America’s Pastime, 14 NV. L.J. 1000, 1005 (2014)
(noting Title IX regulation “unambiguously allowed the development of sex-segre-
gated athletics”).
189. See Richard C. Bell, A History of Women in Sport Prior to Title IX, SPORTS J.,
https://thesportjournal.org/article/a-history-of-women-in-sport-prior-to-title-ix/
[https://perma.cc/NS4J-87GQ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) (recognizing Title IX
“required American society recognize a woman’s right to participate in sports on a
plane equal to that of men”).
190. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1780 (2020) (expressing fear
that new definition of Title VII applied to Title IX will dismantle purpose of Title
IX, creating equal opportunities for women to compete in sports).
191. See, e.g., School Bathroom, Sports Battles Loom After Supreme Court Ruling,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jun. 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
XFFJO3NS000000?bna_news_filter=US-law-week&jcsearch=BNA%252000000172c
36fddf6a7fac37feac50001#jcite [https://perma.cc/8R49-YTSJ] (“The Women’s
Law Center has opposed competition by transgender athletes in women’s sports.
Braceras argued that the decision could lead to men seeking to participate in wo-
men’s sports like field hockey as well.”).
192. See Title IX’s Application to Transgender Athletes: Recent Developments, CRS
(Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-08-12_
LSB10531_c29e5b3db64a0ab10f9b5c1a452c8ed40ee851cd.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3PE3-7Y7W] (stating Title IX regulations uncertain whether there are prohibitions
against transgender students participation in athletics).
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athletics and fairness to women participating in competitive
athletics.193
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, although the Bostock decision was incredibly impor-
tant to the equality and protection of LGBTQ individuals in the
workplace, this decision has inevitably opened the floodgates to liti-
gation in other contexts.194  One particular area that is already be-
ing impacted by the Bostock decision is transgender athletes’
rights.195  The Supreme Court in Bostock clearly articulated that sex
discrimination includes discrimination against transgender individ-
uals.196  The question now is whether banning transgender girls
and women from athletic competition constitutes discrimination
under Title VII and Title IX.197
This issue reached the national stage with Representative Tulsi
Gabbard introducing the “Protect Women’s Sports Act” that would
deny federal funding to schools that permit biological males to par-
ticipate in an athletic program or activity that is designated for bio-
logical women or girls.198  This issue remains prominent in
American politics following President Biden’s executive order.199
193. See Marino & Lee, supra note 133 (mentioning two cases that may be
resolved differently after Bostock decision).
194. See Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
lgbtq-rights/reports/2020/08/26/489772/beyond-bostock-future-lgbtq-civil-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/54RM-M9BS] (“[T]he court’s broad holding could ad-
vance LGBTQ equality under civil rights statutes that prohibit sex discrimination
such as: Title IX, the Affordable Care Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution.”).
195. For further discussion of the impact of Bostock on transgenders’ rights in
athletics, see supra 176-193 notes and accompanying text.
196. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“An employer
who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for
traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex
plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII
forbids.”).
197. See Kleigman supra note 176 (remarking legal teams will have to prove
that banning transgender girls and women from athletic competition is
discrimination).
198. See Carlisle, supra note 20 (indicating significance and relevance of issue
in current events which will ultimately become future court battles).
199. See Bryan Graham, Joe Biden’s Gender Discrimination Order Offers Hope for
Young Trans Athletes, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/
sport/2021/jan/22/transgender-athletes-joe-biden-executive-order [https://
perma.cc/M6U4-LDLF] (explaining President Biden’s executive order called on
federal agencies to broaden the application of Bostock and specifically used lan-
guage that referenced the arena of high school and college sports); Bianca Qui-
lantan, States Challenge Biden on Rights for Transgender Students, POLITICO (Jan. 28,
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Some experts predict that courts will “allow trans participation, but
with caveats – like those instituted by the NCAA and [International
Olympic Committee] (IOC) to regulate trans female testosterone
levels – and not the blanket inclusion that the court allowed with
employment nondiscrimination.”200  Other experts believe that a
blanket inclusion policy is not out of reach for transgender athletes
because the Bostock decision provides momentum for people to
challenge policies that are excluding transgender athletes, and
these cases are on “much stronger footing now” after the Supreme
Court’s ruling.201  What most experts resoundingly agree on is that
this issue will likely end up before the Supreme Court.202
Jacqualyn Gillen*
2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/28/biden-transgender-student-
rights-463277 [https://perma.cc/MWQ6-NEZV ] (“One of Biden’s first actions af-
ter being inaugurated was to issue an executive order saying that a court case
about transgender rights [Bostock] applies to Title IX, a federal education law that
prevents discrimination based on sex.”).
200. See id. (quoting Jami Taylor, University of Toledo political science profes-
sor who specializes in transgender issues).
201. See id. (quoting Erin Buzuvis, Western New England University law pro-
fessor who specializes in gender and discrimination in athletics).
202. See Transgender Athlete Fight to Heat Up as Legislatures Return, BLOOMBERG
LAW, (Oct. 7, 2020) https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X8S052K
8000000?bna_news_filter=US-law-week&jcsearch=BNA%252000000174
db04d23ea5f5dfc5a13d0001#jcite [https://perma.cc/4VMU-C44G] (quoting pro-
fessor at University of Kansas Law School stating, “[t]he heated disputes about
Title IX’s protection of trans athletes is one of the next big issues that will go up to
the Court for resolution”); see also Kleigman supra note 176 (“Multiple Title IX
cases related to trans athletes could end up bouncing around circuit courts with
different decisions – which is a recipe for one of them . . . reaching the nation’s
highest court.”).
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; I would like to thank my family, friends, and mentors for their immense
amount of support and encouragement in all of my athletic and academic
endeavors.
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